Health and the Devolved Regions and Nations by Flear, Mark et al.
Health and the devolved regions and nations
Flear, M., Hayward, K., & Hervey, T. (2018). Health and the devolved regions and nations. In Brexit and the NHS
(pp. 17-18). ESRC UK in a Changing Europe Initiative.
Published in:
Brexit and the NHS
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2018 The UK in a Changing Europe.
This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:06. Aug. 2018
Health and the devolved regions and nations
Flear, M., Hayward, K., & Hervey, T. (2018). Health and the devolved regions and nations. In Brexit and the NHS
ESRC UK in a Changing Europe Initiative.
Published in:
Brexit and the NHS
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:18. Apr. 2018
Brexit 
and the 
NHS
The UK in a Changing Europe promotes rigorous, high-quality and independent research 
into the complex and ever changing relationship between the UK and the EU. It is funded 
by the Economic and Social Research Council and based at King’s College London.
Foreword
The NHS was of course an issue during the EU referendum campaign. However, whilst its 
logo sat on the side of the Vote Leave bus, there was hardly what amounted to a proper 
debate about the possible implications of leaving the EU for the health service in the UK. 
Now, almost two years on, we need to address what Brexit might mean for the NHS and 
public health. This is no easy task.
The EU has little in the way of competence over health policy per se. Rather, membership 
and, by the same token, non-membership make themselves felt via a variety of more or 
less indirect routes, whether the implications of free movement, or of European health 
regulations, or the general economic situation of the country as mediated by our relationship 
with our EU partners. And of course we remain unclear as to what form Brexit will take, 
which merely adds to the complexity of the task at hand.
This report, written by academics from the team at the UK in a Changing Europe, attempts 
to respond to the question of how Brexit might affect the NHS and public health more 
generally. It was written by Catherine Barnard, Matthew Bevington, Nick Fahy, Mark Flear, 
Katy Hayward, Tammy Hervey, Peter Levell, Sarah McCloskey, Jean McHale, Martin McKee 
Jonathan Portes and George Stoye, and I would like to express my sincere thanks to all of 
them for their hard work.
Particular thanks are due to Jean McHale, Tamara Hervey and Mark Flear who provided 
much of the substance of what follows. Matthew Bevington put the report together and 
contributed to several parts of it, while Catherine Barnard went beyond the call of duty in 
checking over a draft at short notice. Navjyot Lehl, as ever, masterminded the design and 
production with her customary good humour and remarkable efficiency.
Professor Anand Menon
Director, the UK in a Changing Europe
Hyperlinks to cited material can be found online at www.ukandeu.ac.uk.
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4Brexit and NHS
Introduction
by Anand Menon and Matthew Bevington
Executive summary
• Public finances. Brexit is forecast to mean less money for public services generally, including the 
NHS, due to lower economic growth and productivity. This of course comes on top of existing 
funding pressures. Should these pressures become more acute after Brexit, there will be direct 
knock-on effects on waiting times, and thus recovery rates, as well as the quality of care that can be 
delivered.
• Staffing. EU nationals play a crucial role in the health service, particularly in London, the south east 
of England and Northern Ireland. These are the areas most vulnerable to skills shortages should 
future immigration rules become more restrictive. The NHS, and social care, face the dual challenge 
of retaining skilled staff already in place and attracting sufficient numbers in future to fill vacancies. 
The government could decide to fund more training places for staff in the UK, but this will not be a 
quick fix and will face similar constraints from the public finances.
• Patients. Future arrangements will depend on a citizen’s status. For UK citizens already resident in 
the EU, and vice versa, together with frontier workers, access to health services is likely to continue 
much as before. However, the potential loss of the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) for UK 
citizens will mean increased costs for travellers, who in future may require health insurance. These 
costs are likely to impact most on the oldest and most vulnerable. 
• Drugs and medical devices. Without special agreements on issues such as regulatory alignment 
and marketing approvals, the UK will lose access to many of the networks, approval systems and 
databases that allow these goods to flow freely between the UK and the rest of the EU. There is also 
a risk that the UK could become a lower priority market when it comes to the launch of new drugs. 
The result may be a delay in the ability of UK patients to access these products. 
• Public health. The EU is committed to safeguarding public health. It has been influential in domestic 
tobacco control policy, for example, which has been critical in addressing the dangers of lung cancer. 
Brexit raises a concern that domestic commitment to such policies will be weakened in the future. 
There are also concerns about the UK’s role in addressing communicable diseases across borders 
through participation in EU agencies. Blood, organ and tissue safety standards are facilitated by 
cross-border vigilance systems which the UK will not be a participant in unless specific agreements 
are put in place.
• Devolved regions and nations. Health policy is devolved to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. 
These latter are anxious to ensure that those powers shared with the EU return to the devolved 
authorities after Britain leaves the EU. Brexit poses particular challenges for health policy on the 
island of Ireland, where healthcare integration is substantial. Changes in the wider UK-EU relationship 
could put at risk numerous cross-border initiatives that support public health in Northern Ireland.
Brexit and NHS
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Despite the infamous red bus, with its claim that leaving the EU would free up money for the health 
service, the potential impact of Brexit on the NHS received relatively little attention during the referendum 
campaign. The Leave side specialised in rather vague pledges of extra funding. For its part, the Remain 
side only managed to come up with one healthcare benefit of EU membership in its campaign leaflet: 
the fact UK citizens have the right to access free or cheap healthcare abroad. 
Yet the campaign touched on genuine public concern. While healthcare was not an important direct 
determinant of how people voted,  the decision by Vote Leave to link EU membership to NHS funding 
proved inspired. Dominic Cummings, seen by many as the mastermind of the Leave campaign, 
subsequently asserted that the referendum would have been lost without the £350 million per week 
claim on the bus. 
Crucially, however, the salience of healthcare has risen since the referendum, not least because of 
severe winter crises. And given the all-pervasive nature of Brexit in contemporary political debates 
the two have, perhaps unsurprisingly, been discussed in tandem to a greater extent than prior to the 
referendum, albeit these debates have, in the main, been stubbornly superficial in nature. 
The EU has limited direct competence over health policy, albeit that it is committed to considering 
the health impacts of its actions in all policy areas. Therefore, the effects of Brexit, whether positive 
or negative, will mostly be indirect. Changes to economic, trade and immigration policy in particular 
will have knock-on effects on healthcare provision and public health. Understanding these effects, and 
the interconnections between different policy areas, is vital if Brexit is to be a success from a health 
perspective. To take but one example, a malfunctioning immigration policy may lead to a malfunctioning 
health system.   
Moreover, the sheer scale of the challenge that Brexit presents makes effective action in other areas of 
public policy much more difficult. Not least, the all-consuming nature of Brexit means real care must be 
taken to avoid falling into the trap, pointed out by the House of Lords, of allowing the political cycle to 
take precedence over long-term planning. 
In what follows, we attempt to analyse the potential impact that Brexit will have on the National 
Health Service. We do not claim to be able to accurately predict the future, not least as the nature of 
Brexit itself remains stubbornly opaque. However, it is possible to analyse, based on the state of the 
negotiations and the positions of the two sides, what possible effect the decision to leave the EU will 
have on healthcare in this country. 
Introduction
by Anand Menon and Matthew Bevington
6Brexit and NHS
Regardless of Brexit, the NHS will face increasing demand and cost pressures. The Office for Budget 
Responsibility (OBR) recently projected that NHS spending would need to increase by 5.3% of 
national income over the next fifty years in order to meet increasing demand for its services and 
other cost pressures—a sum equivalent to about £110 billion in today’s money. This includes meeting 
the challenges from a growing and ageing population, as well as the cost of new technologies and 
treatments, pressures that are common to public and private health systems across the world.
Such increases would be in line with historical increases in NHS spending, which rose from about 3% of 
GDP in the 1950s to about 8% in 2009-10, but would be far above those of the past seven years. Since 
2009-10, real growth in NHS spending has averaged only 1.1% a year. Calls for greater funding have 
increased recently amid evident signs of strain, including longer waiting times and more cancelled 
operations.
The immediate effects of the referendum have increased these pressures. The depreciation of sterling 
has raised the costs to the NHS of goods and supplies that are imported, and the resulting inflation has 
eroded the real value of public-sector workers’ pay. Simply compensating NHS staff for this increase in 
prices would cost around £1 billion in additional salaries. Indeed, in the November 2017 Budget the 
Chancellor announced that the public-sector pay cap would end for most NHS staff, at an expected 
cost of around £700 million in 2017-18. Finding additional funds to cover such increases in future will 
obviously affect the amount of healthcare that can be provided within a given budget.
Given this context, it is hardly surprising that NHS funding has not only been a consistently salient 
political issue but also figured prominently in the 2016 referendum campaign. This famously included 
claims that all of the UK’s gross contribution to the EU budget—currently some £19 billion per year, or 
£360 million a week—could be diverted to the NHS. 
However, these figures are misleading. There are a number of reasons why the full £19 billion will not 
be available. First, this figure includes the UK’s rebate—currently about £5 billion of the full amount—
which has already been allocated domestically to the government’s priorities and simply cannot be 
spent again. The remaining £14 billion could theoretically be redirected to the NHS, but this figure 
also helps to fund EU spending in the UK (for example on farming subsidies) that the government has 
already pledged to maintain for some years. 
The size of the UK’s net contribution to the EU after taking into account both the UK’s budget rebate 
and existing EU spending in the UK is about £8 billion. This represents a more realistic estimate of the 
sum that could be redirected to domestic priorities, including health spending. But even this does 
not take into account future payments that the UK may wish to make to the EU to ensure continued 
market access and participation in EU projects. In the short term, assuming some kind of transitional 
Brexit, the public finances  
and the NHS
by Peter Levell and George Stoye
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period is agreed, the UK will continue to contribute a significant amount to the European Union and 
there may also be some additional payments as part of a “divorce bill” to settle various bills.
Perhaps more importantly, the impact of Brexit on the wider economy is likely to have more bearing on 
the future funding of health services than any sum the UK might recoup from reduced EU contributions. 
Brexit represents a fundamental shake-up of the UK’s relationship with its largest trading partner. If, as 
most economists expect, this reduces economic growth over the medium to long term, the loss to the 
Exchequer will almost certainly outweigh the reduction in our EU contributions. A reduction in GDP of 
just 1% translates to a fall in tax revenue of more than £8 billion (the amount that could conceivably 
be saved by ending budget payments to the EU). 
The OBR has already incorporated some, but not all, of the potential impacts of Brexit into its forecasts. 
In the November 2016 Autumn Statement, it downgraded its forecasts for investment, productivity 
growth and immigration, and raised its inflation forecast relative to what it predicted in the event 
of continued EU membership. The implied hit to the public finances is about £15 billion per year by 
the early 2020s—about 10% of the NHS budget (and almost double any possible saving from ending 
budget payments to the EU). This is despite reduced investment having only a modest impact on tax 
receipts, as investment is taxed less heavily than consumption. Should this, over time, feed into lower 
company profits, the long-run increase in the deficit could be of the order of £3.5 billion. In other 
words, the potential macroeconomic impact of Brexit is such that it might reduce rather than increase 
the funds available for the NHS (and other public services), in both the short and long term. 
Of course, all forecasts must be taken with caution. Growth since the original OBR forecast has so 
far been slightly stronger than expected (although the medium-term outlook is now gloomier than 
it was in November 2016). The fact we do not yet know what the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with 
the EU will be also increases uncertainty about the longer term impacts. However, the OBR forecast 
is predicated on a relatively smooth transition, putting it at the optimistic end of the spectrum. In a 
‘no deal’ scenario, in which the UK reverted to World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules in its trade with 
the EU, the economic dislocation would be much larger. Moreover, the OBR has not yet incorporated 
any longer-term negative impacts of Brexit on productivity, and some economists expect these to be 
significant.  
In short, Brexit is likely to mean less money for public 
services, including the NHS, than otherwise would 
have been the case. Although the NHS budget may 
continue to rise in real terms, it is more likely 
than not that lower economic growth will take 
away funds that would otherwise have been 
available for additional spending increases. 
Even without Brexit, addressing the pressures 
on NHS funding would likely have required 
significant tax increases, extra borrowing 
or diverting more money away from other 
services. Brexit will make responding to these 
challenges even more difficult.
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Staff
by Tamara Hervey and Sarah McCloskey
Free movement of people within the EU has had a significant impact on staffing within the NHS. 
Approximately 200,000 EU27 nationals work in the wider health and care sectors—about 5% of the total 
workforce. EU27 staff are pivotal to the operation of the NHS, especially in London, the South East of 
England and Northern Ireland. 
The UK has never trained enough doctors for its own needs—some 28,000 doctors are non-UK nationals, 
around a quarter of the total. NHS England alone depends on some 11,000 doctors from the EU27, which 
amount to about 10% of all doctors. Add in the further 20,000 NHS England nurses and around 100,000 
social care staff from the EU27 and the sheer scale of reliance on EU migrant workers becomes clear. 
In anticipation of a ‘Brexit effect’, the NHS has already invited bids for a £100 million contract to recruit 
overseas doctors into general practice. And this in a context in which the NHS already has many unfilled 
posts. Restrictive rules on recruiting non-EU nationals are already causing problems for the NHS, and 
extending these to EU nationals will aggravate the situation. 
The uncertainty posed by the Brexit negotiations to date has already affected staffing levels: the Royal 
College of Nursing reported a 92% drop in registrations of nurses from the EU27 in England in March 
2017, and attributed this, at least in part, to “the failure of the government to provide EU nationals in the 
UK with any security about their future”. 
This is also a concern in the life sciences sector, which includes health and pharmaceuticals research and 
employs around 5,000 EU nationals. Should recruitment become problematic, this might in turn affect 
the pharmaceutical sector in particular, where access to necessary skills is a crucial factor in determining 
investment. 
Prior to the 2017 election, the government promised to “make it a priority” during the Brexit negotiations 
to ensure that “staff from EU countries can carry on making their vital contribution to our health and care 
system.” However, the Joint Report on progress in the Article 50 talks, published in December, provides 
protection merely for those already in post, not those who might be employed in future.
After Brexit, staff coming to work in the NHS may be subjected to the same citizenship rights criteria as 
the UK negotiates for all EU27 nationals. The UK’s negotiating position outlines its intention ultimately 
to shift EU citizens simply to “non-UK” status. The Nuffield Trust has warned of potential damage if 
the UK’s future immigration system is overly restrictive. This might mean that vacancies are not filled, 
and EU nationals already working in the health service will face ongoing uncertainty about their status. 
The imposition of additional barriers to potential NHS staff from the EU might also make it harder to 
recruit staff from these states. If European Economic Area nationals have to pay the immigration health 
surcharge – currently paid by non-EEA nationals staying in the UK for six months or more to allow access 
to the NHS – this will obviously represent an additional cost. 
Brexit and NHS
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Staff
by Tamara Hervey and Sarah McCloskey
Whatever the promised new Immigration Bill provides, unless NHS and social care workers are placed 
in a special category, they will be vulnerable to measures designed to limit immigration. All depends on 
the definition of the proposed excluded category of “low-skilled migrants”. Should this include Category 
6 workers, such as senior care workers and nursing assistants, this might place extra pressure on the 
NHS. Moreover, such a restriction would also affect others indirectly involved in healthcare provision, 
including security guards, caterers, launderers and cleaners. 
The government has said that in agriculture the case for a deal to facilitate the arrival of seasonal workers 
to support the needs of farmers is “compelling”. There is clearly a difference between the arrival of 
temporary farm staff and what would be permanent NHS and social care staff, but this demonstrates 
that in principle it may be possible to secure a deal for certain health professions within the future 
immigration system. 
However, potential threats to NHS staffing levels go beyond immediate concerns about immigration. 
Decisions about future regulatory alignment in services will determine whether the qualifications of 
medical professionals will continue to be mutually recognised between the UK and the EU27. Some see 
this as an opportunity to reset national standards. However, this is often based on a misunderstanding 
of the autonomy the NHS already enjoys. Rules related to English language capabilities have been in 
place to secure patient safety throughout the UK’s membership of the EU. But there is clearly a trade-off 
between patient safety as served by restrictions on healthcare professions and patient safety as served 
by having a workforce sufficient to meet the country’s needs.  
Beyond staff numbers, Brexit may affect the working lives of 
health and social care professionals if changes are made 
to EU-retained law concerning working conditions. 
Currently, health and social care staff are protected 
by numerous employment rights derived from 
EU law, including non-discrimination at work, 
maternity and paternity leave, and security of 
rights where another employer takes over a 
contract to provide services. 
The NHS Employers organisation sees this 
is as an opportunity to bring about positive 
change by replacing prescriptive rules that 
can hamper the efficient functioning of the 
health service. Others, including over a dozen 
Royal Colleges, insist these protections must 
be retained. The Working Time Directive has 
presented challenges in health and social care, and 
remains a source of controversy within the profession. 
It has attracted much criticism—including from former UK 
Prime Minister David Cameron—because of its perceived rigidity. 
Nevertheless, junior doctors have sought to guarantee its explicit inclusion in their new national 
employment contract.
Finally, pressures on staffing might pose a challenge when it comes to maintaining the UK’s position 
as the European hub for life sciences. The success of this collaborative work hinges on the mobility of 
researchers and harmonisation of regulations.
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Patients 
by Tamara Hervey, Sarah McCloskey and Mark Flear
The current system for patients in the EU is based on reciprocal rights and freedom of movement. EU 
law seeks to remove any barriers that healthcare provision (or the lack thereof) could pose to EU citizens 
or their families visiting or living in another EU country. The government has acknowledged that it is 
attempting to achieve the same reciprocal healthcare benefits when the UK leaves the EU as currently 
exist. 
Under current arrangements, each EU member agrees to reimburse any other EU member that treats 
people covered by its public health service. The principle is that visitors are treated in the same way as 
locals. The system covers migrant workers, border and frontier workers (those who live in one country but 
travel across a border for work) and people visiting for work and leisure. This rights-based cooperation 
facilitates access to healthcare for those with chronic health conditions, retirees and tourists. It also 
improves service efficiency.
Northern Ireland and Ireland provide perhaps the best example of how this works. Services designed for 
both sides of the Irish border meet collective healthcare needs in the area. Sexual health, diabetes and 
eating disorders are all treated in this way, with integrated services offered to patients in both Northern 
Ireland and Ireland. For instance, the radiotherapy centre at Altnagelvin Hospital in Derry/Londonderry 
is accessible to patients in County Donegal in the Republic who would otherwise have to travel long 
distances—to Dublin or Galway—to obtain the same treatment. 
EU integration has also enabled economies of scale across the Irish border, such as the sharing of key 
healthcare services, particularly where specific expertise and facilities are not viable in a small region 
such as Northern Ireland. In 2014 the Northern Irish and Republic health ministers agreed that there 
would be a joint child heart facility established in Dublin. Between January and September 2017, 23 
children travelled from Northern Ireland to Our Lady’s Children’s Hospital in Dublin. Such cooperation is 
facilitated by the EU Directive on the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and on EU rules 
on data protection that enable the sharing of patient details. It is possible that access to these shared 
facilities and similar ones (such as the North West Cancer Centre) can be facilitated by the future UK-EU 
relationship and even bilateral UK-Ireland arrangements under the Common Travel Area. 
The European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) allows visitors to another EU country to access healthcare 
in that country. The EHIC applies even to those with disruptive chronic conditions. For instance, it 
allows the UK’s 29,000 dialysis patients to arrange in advance to have treatment in any EU/EEA country, 
although this depends on the necessary resources being available. There are no official figures for the 
number of people who take up this opportunity, but Kidney Care Dialysis Freedom has arranged for 
around 1,700 patients to travel to the EU in the past two years. Kidney Care UK thinks this is likely to be 
an underestimation of the actual figure. People can also access specialist medical treatment in another 
EU country with the permission of their home state (S2 registration). 
Brexit and NHS
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Most importantly though, EU nationals living in another EU country can access the treatment they 
need (S1 registration). Around 190,000 British pensioners live in the EU27 and rely on these reciprocal 
healthcare arrangements. The UK contributes about £500 million annually towards their care and 
receives £50 million for care provided to EU nationals in the UK. Average treatment costs for UK 
pensioners in the UK would be about double that of paying for their treatment elsewhere in the EU, 
mainly because of patient co-payments. If the UK did not conclude a Withdrawal Agreement with the 
EU, and were all these pensioners to return to the UK, the NHS would need some 900 additional beds 
to ensure sufficient capacity. 
Under the terms of the Joint Report, those visiting another EU member state on exit day would still be 
covered by the EHIC. For everyone else, access to the EHIC will depend on the terms agreed with the 
EU under the Withdrawal Agreement and on the future relationship. It is not clear what will happen 
on the island of Ireland. 
It is possible that the UK will negotiate access to the EHIC as part of the future UK-EU relationship. But 
should it fail to do so, UK nationals who want to travel to the EU in the future—some 53 million visits 
from the UK to the EU27 take place each year—will have three options: they could purchase private 
travel insurance, travel without insurance and risk significant healthcare bills or simply not travel at 
all. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) has estimated that, if the EHIC is withdrawn, the cost of 
treating UK citizens abroad will be about £160m. 
For some, purchasing private insurance will not be an option. For example, any private travel insurance 
that is available to dialysis patients will be extremely expensive. For those who can get insurance, older 
people—who are already the biggest spenders on healthcare—will face the steepest costs. According 
to the ABI, the average cost of health insurance claims for those over 66 is almost three times higher 
than for those under 30. 
The government could offset some of this by mandating a 
basic healthcare package for travel insurance, though 
there is no equivalent system for travel to other 
countries. Such a scheme is, however, used in 
the Netherlands for basic healthcare. Typically, 
there is a set fee for all customers, regardless of 
their age or risk profile, and all insurers must 
offer the same package and accept everyone 
who applies. However, such cover would not 
include more complex conditions, which 
older people are more likely to have, and 
consequently they would still incur additional 
costs. 
The government may also be unwilling to 
intervene in the health insurance market, or to 
shoulder the fiscal cost of administering such a 
scheme. However, given that three-quarters of all 
visits abroad by UK residents are to the EU, a basic travel 
insurance package could cover the vast majority of UK travellers. 
But this would still be a cost that they do not currently have to meet while covered by the EHIC.
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Drugs and medical devices 
by Jean McHale and Matthew Bevington
EU law underpins the regulation of pharmaceuticals in the UK. Medicines are approved via one of two 
routes, a centralised or a decentralised process. Under the former, drug approvals are issued by the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA) and are valid across all member states. Under the latter, approval 
can be given by the equivalent authority operating within each member state. In the UK, this is the 
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). 
Where medicines are subject to the decentralised process, the MHRA already has operating and 
approval systems in place. However, certain pharmaceuticals, such as orphan medicines, which are 
used to treat a relatively small number of patients who suffer from rare diseases, are not subject to 
the decentralised process. They must be authorised centrally by the EMA. Unless there are special 
agreements put in place post-Brexit, the implications would be serious.
First, unless this is subject to a specific sectoral deal, the UK would not have access to cross-EU 
monitoring and notification systems for pharmaceuticals. This loss of access is indicated in the 
Commission’s draft Withdrawal Agreement of February 2018. Second, pharmaceuticals produced in 
the UK would not necessarily be approved for use across the EU. Third, the MHRA would need to 
establish its own specific measures to enable such approvals at the domestic level. It appears from 
evidence to the Health Select Committee in January that the MHRA is already planning for this. It is 
important that the UK government ensures that the MHRA has the necessary resources and support 
to undertake this increased workload. 
Fourth, it would be in the UK’s interests to ensure, as far as possible, alignment of standards with the 
EU to facilitate production and marketing of pharmaceuticals, at least for the near future. This is to 
prevent any adverse impact on patient safety and on the pharmaceutical industry. Such alignment 
has been strongly advocated by pharmaceutical companies operating in the UK in evidence to Select 
Committees. Linked to this, once the UK leaves the EU it will not be part of the EU pharmacovigilance 
networks, unless there is a specific sectoral agreement reached.
Practical concerns have also been raised about the future status of the UK as a market for new drugs. 
There is a danger that it would be regarded as a comparatively low priority market given its size 
relative to the EU and the US. New drugs might be less likely to be launched in the UK, therefore taking 
much longer to reach patients. 
Health secretary Jeremy Hunt has suggested that drugs approved for sale in Europe would be 
automatically licensed in UK, but this would by no means guarantee equivalent treatment of UK-
based products on the EU side. Nevertheless, such a move would speed up the process of getting new 
products onto the UK market. 
Brexit and NHS
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However, such an arrangement would raise accountability issues. The UK would be entirely dependent 
on the regulatory procedures of the EU without any meaningful say over how they were designed and 
implemented. UK authorities would be responsible for any dangers to public health arising from the 
sale or use of EU-based products without any power to hold regulators to account, which might prove 
politically unsustainable. 
The Prime Minister went further in her Mansion House speech in March, suggesting that the UK 
would be seeking access to the EMA, among other agencies, via associate membership. Whether 
this can be achieved in practice is not clear, as such third country status has not been afforded in 
the past. 
If it can’t be achieved, this would affect the 274 small and medium-sized pharmaceutical enterprises 
based in the UK that are registered with the European Medicines Agency, the EU’s medicines regulator, 
and the 427 products that are centrally authorised and authorised for sale from the UK. For these 
products, without a comprehensive sectoral agreement that maintained current levels of regulatory 
alignment and mutual recognition of authorisations, all would have to be transferred to EU-based 
authorisation holders to continue being sold in the EU. The EMA has indicated that these transfers 
must be completed by the time the UK leaves the EU in March 2019.
Moreover, when it comes to trade deals with other states there is enormous uncertainty about what 
access foreign pharmaceutical companies might be granted to the UK and what access UK firms will 
enjoy abroad. Such questions will be the subject of negotiation during trade talks with third countries. 
In terms of a future agreement with the US, there has been 
considerable criticism of the deal Australia signed with 
the US in 2004 particularly when it comes to the 
terms related to pharmaceuticals. That agreement 
contained greater protection for intellectual 
property (IP) rights, including patents, which 
benefitted those US pharmaceutical producers 
which held patents for  the drugs they 
produced. This in turn impacted on those 
companies that produced generic drugs, 
limiting their ability to sell cheaper versions 
of the patented products. 
The vast majority of drugs bought in the UK 
are generics, which account for 84% of the 
pharmaceuticals sold. Were similar provisions 
to be included in a future trade deal with the 
US—and a pharmaceuticals chapter would likely 
be included—then prices for both the public and the 
NHS could rise if rules favoured patent-holding firms over 
generics businesses.
Clinical trials concerning pharmaceuticals are currently subject to the EU Clinical Trials Directive. This 
led to the first statutory requirement in the UK for a range of regulatory procedures in the area of 
clinical research on humans, including requirements concerning mandatory research ethics committee 
14
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approval and informed consent. This is due to be replaced by a new EU regulation, to be implemented 
in 2019, after the UK leaves the EU, although the terms of the transition period, or domestic legislative 
choice, will determine whether or not it is brought into UK law. 
One aspect of this regulation is a new cross-EU computer database into which all clinical trial 
applications will have to be entered in order to be valid. Depending on the terms of a transition period, 
the UK may need to implement the regulation. Although this would ensure alignment post-Brexit in 
terms of approval criteria, it would not enable the UK to have access to the database unless a specific 
sectoral agreement was reached. The absence of such an agreement could jeopardise the work of UK 
researchers who want to undertake cross-EU clinical trials. However, the MHRA has indicated that it 
does not see this as a major issue, as international clinical trials are undertaken with collaborators 
across jurisdictions.
Turning from pharmaceuticals to medical devices, the approval of these is delegated to commercial 
companies, known as “notified bodies”. These operate in different member states and provide 
approvals that are valid across the EU. The role and operation of these bodies has come under some 
criticism. Incidents such as the Poly Implant Prostheses breast implant scandal, when the use of 
unauthorised silicon in some implants led them to rupture, have helped to drive reform in this area. 
Medical devices regulation is due to be tightened through two new EU regulations set to come into 
force in 2020 (general devices regulation) and 2022 (in vitro devices regulation). 
Part of these reforms will be accompanied by a new EU-wide electronic monitoring system, through 
the EMA, which will develop and expand existing databases. In addition, another database containing 
information on medical devices will be linked to the new EU Clinical Trials Database. Continued access 
to these databases post-Brexit would require specific sectoral 
deals. However, for medical devices there is an existing 
mutual recognition agreement between the EU and 
Switzerland that may provide a possible model, 
although the EU has so far remained firm that 
the Switzerland model is not on offer for the 
UK’s future EU relationship.
Major uncertainties also remain in relation 
to access to other EU systems that affect 
patient health. For example, in leaving the 
EU the UK will be leaving Euratom, the EU 
atomic agency community. Concerns have 
been expressed as to whether this may result 
in problems in accessing radioisotopes used 
in cancer treatment, which have very short 
half-lives and cannot be stockpiled. However, 
the government has argued that because they are 
“not fissile nuclear material”, and thus not capable of 
reacting, they would in any event fall outside international 
nuclear safeguards. Again, in her Mansion House speech, 
the Prime Minister made reference to the benefits of a close working 
relationship with Euratom but was unspecific about how this may be achieved. 
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Public health 
by Jean McHale
Any departure from the EU approach to regulating health and social care will have significant 
consequences given the complex arrangements that are in place in these sectors. In biomedical 
research, for example, UK organisations are currently the largest beneficiaries of EU health research 
funds in Europe; EU research funding via the Horizon 2020 programme has benefitted the NHS; and EU 
collaboration in clinical research has generally been to the advantage of UK healthcare. 
The EU’s common legal frameworks—for instance, on data protection, human tissue regulation and the 
safety of clinical trials—underpin that collaboration. The Prime Minister in her Mansion House speech 
mentioned the prospect of a “far-reaching science and innovation pact with the EU, facilitating the 
exchange of ideas and researchers”, with payment for access. Whether this will be welcomed by the 
EU is another matter. Its agreements with Switzerland over participation in such research programmes 
have been fraught, and it is questionable whether the EU would want to reciprocate the enthusiasm 
of the Prime Minister on this issue. 
The EU has played an important role in the development of domestic public health law and policy. 
For instance, while some aspects of tobacco control policy are matters for domestic law—such as the 
ban on smoking in public places—tobacco control in general is affected by EU Law. The EU Tobacco 
Products Directive regulates a range of matters, including tobacco advertising and nicotine levels 
in tobacco. The Directive also addresses matters concerning trade in illicit tobacco, with measures 
directed at tracking and tracing tobacco products. It is important that the UK’s commitment to tobacco 
control does not become weakened after it leaves the EU.
The safety and quality of donated blood, tissue, and cells and organs are also subject to EU regulation. 
The three main directives in this area, operating alongside a number of related directives, set out 
minimum quality and safety standards. Establishments dealing with blood, organs or tissue need to be 
accredited, designated, authorised or licensed, and inspected by the relevant authorities of member 
states (such as the Human Tissue Authority in the UK) for the procurement, testing, processing, 
preservation, storage or distribution of human blood, tissues and cells. 
Further provisions relate to the clinical selection of donors, information and consent. The Directives 
have also led to the introduction of standard operating procedures for the donation, procurement, 
packaging, labelling and transportation of human materials. Some of these safeguards will remain 
in domestic law through the EU Withdrawal Bill, unless amended by ministerial action as the Bill will 
allow. A proposed amendment to the Bill seeks to secure that Brexit will ‘do no harm’ to health. 
In other areas, however, reciprocity is required for the system to operate. For example, certain safety 
issues are targeted through specific cross-EU rapid alert systems, such as the Rapid Alert System for 
Human Tissues and Cells (RATC) and the Rapid Alert System for Blood and Blood Components (RAB). 
These enable information regarding adverse reactions to be shared quickly across member states. 
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The UK would not have access to these rapid alert and information systems unless there were specific 
sectoral agreements in place. The Commission’s draft Withdrawal Agreement, published in February, 
indicates that the UK would not have access to such computerised databases post-Brexit.
The UK currently exports organs for transplant to other EU member states, with some organs being 
transferred across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is important that 
steps are taken to maintain such exchange systems after the UK leaves the EU. The EU is also strongly 
against commercial dealing in human materials and parts. Provisions to this effect are contained in 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and also in relation to the specific blood, organs and tissue 
directives. While at domestic level, in relation to organ transplants, the UK has also been opposed to 
commodification, it is important to ensure that such commitments are not weakened once the UK 
leaves the EU. 
On communicable diseases, the EU has its own agency, the European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC), which is concerned with identification, assessment and communication of threats. 
It undertakes a Health Security Initiative, which requires notification of health threats with the Health 
Security Committee, having a legal basis to act on such threats. The EU’s role in this area is still evolving 
and the main instruments in relation to disease prevention derive from international law. Nonetheless, 
after Brexit the UK will not have access to such EU networks, which remains a major concern.
Data Protection is a further topic where the EU has been particularly influential. In UK domestic law 
there have long been commitments to safeguard the confidentiality of patient information through 
the equitable remedy of breach of confidence, which is today also bolstered by protection through the 
Human Rights Act 1998. However, data protection law also provides specific safeguards in relation to 
individual data access and control. 
Currently, the law in this area is being reformed through the introduction of the General Data 
Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Bill 2017, implementing EU law. While initially the UK 
will therefore in many respects be aligned with EU law, the question is what happens longer term. 
The structure of the legislation would enable comparatively 
straightforward amendments post-Brexit. In the 
Mansion House speech in March 2018, the Prime 
Minister emphasised the importance of Data 
Protection and the need for specific agreements 
and a role for the Information Commissioner. 
It remains to be seen to what extent the EU 
is prepared to accept the UK’s proposals on 
this. It is important that commitment to 
patient autonomy and control of access to 
their own personal information is not put 
in jeopardy in the future. 
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Health and the devolved 
regions and nations  
by Mark Flear, Katy Hayward and Tamara Hervey
Within the UK, public health and the NHS are largely the responsibility of the devolved regions and 
nations. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (NI) have therefore developed their own 
distinct laws and policies. Some areas of England are also experimenting with forms of devolution.
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU means that powers currently exercised at the EU level will be repatriated 
to the UK. The EU Withdrawal Bill had anticipated that even those EU laws currently implemented by 
the devolved institutions would, in the first instance, be returned to the UK government. However, 
David Lidington, the minister overseeing the devolution settlement from Brexit, has said that the Bill 
will be changed to ensure powers return to the devolved administrations initially. The Scottish and 
Welsh governments dismissed the offer out of hand. Negotiations are ongoing and there is still a lack 
of clarity about how these competences will be redistributed back to the devolved level.
This is extremely important given that health is a devolved matter that is currently deeply affected by 
EU law. The UK Government has found that there are 141 areas of overlap between EU and devolved 
powers in Northern Ireland, 111 in Scotland and 64 in Wales. The full lists are not transparent, but 
Institute for Government analysis suggests that a majority of these policy areas concern the environment 
and transport, while several cover matters for which the Department of Health is responsible.
Over the past twenty years, distinctive health policy in areas such as minimum alcohol pricing, obesity 
and tobacco regulation has developed in the devolveds. While the expectation had been that effective 
policy in these areas would require further devolution of powers, the trend towards centralisation 
indicated by the EU Withdrawal Bill means there are at least two significant shifts to bear in mind. 
The first is a shift in the context for health policy in the devolved regions and nations in future. The Bill, 
in its current form, makes the UK level more important in that the powers repatriated from the EU will 
initially be placed there. There is the possibility that some of these powers could be ‘released’ to the 
devolveds, but this would be at the discretion of UK ministers. The second shift is that the devolveds 
will have less ability and scope for action where powers are not released to them. In addition, the use 
of UK-wide frameworks covering areas where EU and devolved powers currently intersect limits the 
devolveds’ ability to act if it is deemed to undermine the UK ‘common market’. 
There are concerns that Brexit might have a negative impact on population health in the devolveds. 
In Wales, the withdrawal of EU funding might have a long term adverse impact on the determinants 
of health. In Scotland, several health projects have benefited from EU funding under the Interreg 
programme, which will cease by the end of any transition phase. 
EU rules on reciprocal rights and the free movement of goods and people are currently vital for the 
provision and delivery of health services. Many of these rules are applied and administered at the 
level of the devolveds. The fact that EU27 nationals will become overseas nationals following Brexit 
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means that the rules that apply to them when they access NHS treatment (so-called overseas charging 
rules) will change. However, these rules currently differ in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and 
until there is clarity over which competences will return to the devolveds we have little idea what the 
future arrangements will look like. 
Despite the different health systems in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, cross-border 
integration is clearly evident in healthcare. We have already discussed some of the aspects of this 
above, but the circulation of health-related goods and services, health professionals and patients, 
and the sharing of some facilities and funding across the Irish border will be challenged by Brexit. For 
example, unhindered by border checks and supported by reciprocal arrangements between healthcare 
providers in NI and the Republic of Ireland, an ambulance can travel to wherever is closest and best 
for any particular patient on either side of the border. Such arrangements would be in doubt if a 
‘hardening’ of the customs border between the UK and the EU produced restrictions on the movement 
of pharmaceutical products or medical devices, or even medical staff.
EU funding under the Regional Development Fund and the PEACE programme has supported the 
provision and development of health-related services in NI, across the NI-Republic border and in 
Western Scotland. For example, Interreg Europe funding supports the cross-border partnership of 
Cooperation and Working Together (CAWT). Up to 2015 CAWT had delivered 12 large-scale projects 
and services, 121 new services had been implemented to the direct benefit of 53,000 people, and an 
additional €30 million had been invested in health and social care. The UK-EU Joint Report in December 
2017 pledged that future support for NI through PEACE and Interreg would be ‘examined favourably’. 
But this agreement is yet to see legal form and it leaves uncertainty for similar projects in Scotland.
The direct importance of the context, funding and laws 
of the EU for a wide range of health services and 
provision is evident in all of the devolved regions 
and nations. This adds a layer of complexity to 
the process of withdrawal that cannot be dealt 
with adequately on an all-UK wide basis.
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The impact of Brexit on the NHS and public policy will hinge on a number of factors. Clearly, the state of 
the UK government’s finances will be crucial in determining future health provision. In common with the 
broad consensus among independent economists, and the official forecasts produced by the OBR, our 
analysis does not foresee any dividend for the NHS from the UK leaving the EU. 
On the contrary, there are likely to be further pressures on public-service funding more broadly from a hit 
to economic growth caused by Brexit. This will mean tough choices for the government. It could decide 
to increase healthcare funding, but this will have to come from raising taxes, borrowing or diverting 
funds from other priorities. 
The UK’s decision to leave the EU has not created the funding pressures on the NHS, but it is likely 
to exacerbate them. Similarly, should funding pressures become more acute after Brexit, there will be 
direct knock-on effects on waiting times, and thus recovery rates, as well as the quality of care that can 
be delivered. 
Brexit is also likely to worsen existing staff shortages, potentially reducing service quality. There has 
already been a fall in the number of EU-origin nurses, attributed at least in part to uncertainty about 
their future status. Longer term, the NHS and the social care sector are dependent on immigration policy 
for fulfilling staffing needs, and it is as yet unclear what this policy will be. The risks, however, are evident. 
The government may decide to put greater funding into training places for doctors and financial support 
for training nurses, as well as other support staff. However, the budget constraints alluded to above 
stand here too. The UK has benefitted greatly from importing skilled health workers that other countries 
have paid to train. There is a balance to be struck between an immigration regime that provides enough 
skilled workers on the one hand and training sufficient staff in the UK to fill vacancies on the other. 
However, the latter does not represent a quick fix, as training takes the better part of a decade.  
Reliance on EU staff differs widely across the UK. This means that we should expect different areas to 
experience different levels of disruption, with London, the south east of England and Northern Ireland 
most likely to be affected. It should also be noted that our analysis does not cover social care in any depth, 
which will be particularly badly affected if future immigration requirements become more restrictive for 
key personnel in this sector. 
For patients, there are likely to be disadvantages from leaving the EU, mainly by virtue of losing access 
to healthcare in their country of residence (especially for pensioners) or to the EHIC. Although the EHIC 
itself is by no means comprehensive, it does offer security to UK citizens travelling to the EU, who make 
up the vast majority of UK visitors abroad. This is not to say that some form of reciprocal healthcare 
agreement cannot be reached, but it would probably only cover current EHIC holders, and for future 
patients probably be more limited in scope than it is now. Although agreeing this individual measure may 
seem eminently achievable in isolation, dozens if not hundreds of such agreements will be required to 
maintain current benefits in the health policy area alone. 
In sum, the effect of these changes is likely to increase costs for UK travellers to the EU by virtue of 
requiring health insurance, which itself will be more expensive than it would have been without the EHIC 
behind it. Those worst affected will be the elderly and those with serious underlying conditions, who 
may not qualify for health insurance or for whom it will be expensive. 
Furthermore, Brexit might impact on the socioeconomic determinants of health, such as employment, 
income and living costs. A recent paper found that the life expectancy of a boy from the richest fifth 
of neighbourhoods in England was 8.4 years higher than that of a boy from the poorest fifth; for girls 
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this gap was 5.8 years. Although this is a complex issue, and many other factors as well as the UK’s 
relationship with the EU will drive changes, most economic analysis suggests that there will be a hit to 
the UK economy from Brexit, which will translate into worse health outcomes. Wealth and health are 
very closely connected, so it follows that if the population becomes less wealthy, then health outcomes 
will be affected. 
It is too early to say what degree of alignment will exist between the UK and the EU after Brexit. There 
are numerous health systems and databases, such as the Clinical Trials Database and the Rapid Alert 
System for Blood and Blood Components (RAB) that will require specific agreements in order that the UK 
retain access. This issue is particularly acute on the island of Ireland, where the two healthcare systems 
are well integrated. Although specific agreements allowing, say, ambulances to operate across borders 
would conceivably be possible, any restrictions on the movement of healthcare goods, services and 
people will be to the detriment of patients on both sides of the border.  
There are wider concerns from the devolved governments that areas of healthcare competence previously 
held at EU level being recentralised will shift the balance of policymaking powers, jeopardising existing 
projects funded through EU projects and having wider impacts on the socio-economic determinants of 
health. 
Yet it will be the detail of the agreements that the UK 
will need to sign with the EU that will be decisive for 
public health and the NHS. We have set out what 
we consider the central areas that need to be 
addressed in order for the NHS to be successful 
and improve health outcomes after Brexit. 
What cannot be in doubt, though, is the 
complexity and scale of the task facing the 
government. Many of these issues can be 
resolved with political will and appropriate 
resources. When it comes to both, however, 
the pressure will be significant as the 
Government will need to deal with Brexit in 
tandem with pre-existing ones over long-term 
sustainability and social care provision.
Ensuring a well-functioning health service, and 
protecting public health, after Brexit is by no means 
impossible, but the challenges are significant. 
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